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1 Introduction.

Meinong in his and our times

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Onset

Various considerations prompted the idea of undertaking this historical and conceptual reconstruction of the theories developed in Graz at the turn of the nineteenth century by a group of philosophers and experimental psychologists led by Alexius Meinong. The majority of the contributions to this book adhere closely to the original texts in order to provide a reliable account of difficult and complex themes, while also seeking to reconstruct their vocabulary and conceptual framework. Nevertheless, the purpose of the work is mainly theoretical, not historical.

The intention is, firstly, to propose for contemporary debate a way of 'doing' philosophy which was closely bound up with the sciences of its time, and in particular with psychology. Secondly, the aim is to present conceptions developed in Brentano's *theory of intentional reference* today viewed mainly as the analytic reduction of a semantic theory of intentionality.¹ Thirdly, the book starts from the conviction that a theory of *direct reference*, in its variants developed by Brentano's pupils and today put forward by certain sectors of the cognitive sciences and research in artificial intelligence,² finds substantial matter for reflection in the theories developed by Meinong's school in Graz.³

The affinities between the exigencies and problems of the contemporary cognitive sciences and the intellectual climate at the beginning of the last century amount to much more than mere cultural resemblance. At the end of the 1900s, for psychology and philosophy, laboratories of experimental psychology constituted something similar to what those of the contemporary cognitive sciences constitute for psychophysics and theory of mind. Then as now, science and philosophy have an essential feature in common: the interest in *cognitive processes* distinctive of theory of mind, epistemology, and theory of language. At the end of the nineteenth century, in fact, concepts such as 'evidence,' 'content,' 'act' or 'object' were discussed in epistemology, in ontology, in logic and in psychology, given that the

dichotomy between theory of knowledge and formal (or better, formalized) theory had not yet arisen. Subsequently, following the 'turn' of the 1930s, the more strictly psychological aspects of both philosophical and scientific reflection disappeared from the majority of disciplines, and they have only reappeared in the last twenty years with the growth of the cognitive sciences.⁴

Fourthly, the theories of the Graz school again raise the possibility of engaging in the scientific metaphysics and ontology that for so long have been considered 'off limits;' and this in itself constitutes a major intellectual challenge.

But what was it that happened a hundred years ago in a remote province of the Austro-Hungarian Empire that was of such interest and singularity that it arouses the interest of contemporary reflection? And why does Meinong's school constitute such a fundamental passage in the development of the theory of intentional reference?

Intentional reference

When in 1874 Brentano introduced the notion of *intentional reference* (*intentionale Beziehung*) in his *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, he could not have foreseen all the consequences that would ensue from that particular, and so ambiguous, passage in his book. And yet it sparked a surprising intellectual debate that would involve Brentano himself for the rest of his life, many of his contemporaries, and especially the best of his pupils who inherited his intellectual legacy.⁵

All subsequent developments of Brentano's descriptive psychology—in Stumpf's eidetics, Marty's conceptual semantics, Husserlian phenomenology, Meinong's theory of objects, the logico-philosophical school of Lvov-Warsaw, the two branches of Gestalt—centred, in fact, on one key concept, that of *intentional presentation* (*intentionale Vorstellung*). In other words, one can re-read 'Brentano's school' in its entirety as a painstaking endeavor to construct a variety of modern *realism* from essentially cognitive phenomena (presentations, judgements, feelings).⁶

But what was it that induced a neo-Aristotelian like Brentano, who had devoted his early works to reinterpreting Aristotle's metaphysics and theory of categories, to concern himself with questions debated by the psychologists of the time, and even by experimental psychologists?

Brentano's re-reading of Aristotle's table of categories, mediated by the Aristotelian theory of sensation,⁷ had confronted him with the problem of founding a *realist metaphysics*. He started by addressing the following questions: What is the role of imagery (*phantasia*) in the construction of

empirical reality? Are the objects of sensation external or internal to the representation? And, specifically, how does the concept of 'object' develop out of the structure of the perceptive or representational continuum?

When analyzing Aristotle's doctrine of common faculty (*koinè aîsthe-sis*), Brentano reached the conclusion that the objects of the senses are *internal* objects. He writes in his book *The Psychology of Aristotle* as follows:

External objects (*Objecte*) are not its [of the common faculty] object (*Gegenstand*). Because the differences among sensations stand in a relation analogous to the differences among objects, then necessarily apparent in the differences among the former are also the differences among the latter, with the consequence that the distinction among heterogeneous objects of sense can be related to the faculty of that sense... None of the contradictions that this assumption may generate are really produced by it; the assumption does not in fact entail either that the sense which distinguishes among heterogeneous objects shares the same proper object with the other senses, or that more than one proper object pertains to it. Its proper object is solely sensations, just as colours are the proper object of sight; but perceiving that we see whiteness and taste sweetness, and distinguishing these sensations, teaches us at the same time the analogous difference between whiteness and sweetness themselves.⁸

Thus, Brentano's re-reading of Aristotle's classic texts brought him to the problem of psychophysics, which in those years was subject to experimental analysis by, amongst others, J. Müller, Wundt, Weber, and Fechner.

In particular, Müller's theory of specific energies stated that it is not external *stimuli* that are perceived but the *contents* of the nerve fibers, these being *signs* of transcendent objects. Brentano went a step further by considering the *physiological* content of the fibres to be *psychologically modified* in the structure of intentional reference as an *attribute of the subject*. In this way he offered a new interpretation of the Aristotelian theory of inherence, and asserted that psychic phenomena could not be reduced to physiological factors alone.

Brentano was also one of the first critics of the Weber-Fechner law, according to which the intensity of sensations was a function of the intensity of their stimuli. He pointed out that the law did not resolve a fundamental problem of psychophysics, namely that the *difference among sensations* did not coincide with the *perception of that difference*. As to the latter he asked whether it was quantitative in nature (like the difference between the extensions of two surfaces) or qualitative (like the difference between two shades of red). Moreover, was the perception of difference relative (i) to the underlying processes of *apprehension* or (ii) to their *contents*? Did it relate,

that is to say, to the 'seeing' or to what is 'seen,' i.e. to the correlates 'red,' 'dark,' 'tall,' and so on? Brentano finally observed that the Weber-Fechner law did not define the actual nature of sensations: did they belong to the physiological level, to the phenomenal level, and/or to both? And he also inquired whether sensations were phenomenally wholly devoid of cognitive integrations and representative elements.⁹

These questions provided the grounding for *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, a first attempt to construct a theory of direct reference without it being necessary to postulate reductionist hypotheses, or in other words, without having to relate psychic phenomena to physical or physiological ones. Set in this context, Brentano's work, despite its eminently theoretical character, can also be read as a contribution to the psychophysical debate of the time.

In *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, after specifying the nature of psychic phenomena or presentations (*Vorstellungen*) as *acts* of psychic energy (which may originate either in sensation or in the fantasy, both of which are *internal* presentations), Brentano identified their essential characteristic as *directedness* towards an object of some kind. As he writes in the celebrated passage mentioned earlier:

Every psychic phenomenon is characterized by what the medieval scholastics termed the intentional (i.e. mental) in/existence of an object and which I shall call, albeit using expressions not devoid of ambiguity, reference to a content, directedness towards an object (*Objectum*) (which should not be taken to be real), or immanent objectivity. Every psychic phenomenon contains something in itself as an object (*Gegenstand*), although each of them does not do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is accepted or rejected, in love something is loved, in hate hated, in desire desired, etc.¹⁰

Brentano was aware from the outset of an intrinsic ambiguity in this formulation which was exacerbated by the medieval implications of the term 'intentional.'¹¹ In fact, in 1874 the act of presentation is simultaneously defined as:

1. reference to a *content* (*Inhalt*)
2. directedness to an *object* (*Objectum*) or *immanent objectuality*, which may not necessarily be effectively existent;
3. containing something in itself *as an object* (*Gegenstand*).

Although his theory underwent subsequent developments, Brentano always preserved its assumption that psychic phenomena, like a *seeing*, a *feeling*, a *hearing*, an *imagining*, and so on, besides possessing intentional existence

in the sense that they are mentally *directed* towards an object, are *really, effectively (wirklich)* existent, and that it is this feature that essentially distinguishes them from physical phenomena, which for Brentano are mediated, and not evident, *contents*.

Besides their reference to something as object, psychic phenomena are also characterized by the fact that:

1. *they lack spatial extension* (in the physical sense);
2. they are governed *solely by inner perception*;
3. they are always perceived as *units* (though not elementary ones);
4. they are *evident*.

Turning to *physical phenomena* (like a *heard* sound, a *seen* colour, an *imagined* something, etc.), Brentano maintained that these can be considered solely as *contents* (and not as objects) of psychic phenomena. Consequently, the authentic objects of psychology are only *psychic phenomena* in the sense of acts of presentation or *effective states*.

On these premises, according to Brentano, *representation is wholly internal*, although it is based on *acts of real perception* of the physical world. The acts of intentional presentation indicate that 'something (*etwas*) manifests itself psychologically' to consciousness and has an *ontological* ground, like the elements that underpin particular sensible states.

It should be noted that, in the actuality of the intentional presentation, there is still neither an Ego nor a first person perspective. For Brentano, intentional presentations are concrete *spatio-temporal events* of psychic energy or activity. They act as 'pointers' towards an *inner* object of some kind, and primarily towards phenomenal objects like the *patches* of colour, sounds, odours and tactile perceptions given in an actual present. The ground of these phenomena is proximal space—that is, the visual, auditory, tactile, graspable phenomenal space of our everyday experience. We perceive the features of phenomenal space through our sight (shape, size, position, movement), touch and kinaesthesia (shape, size, distance), hearing (direction of sounds) and olfaction (direction of odors). From an actual phenomenological point of view, we immediately perceive what are not yet 'objects' but still events.

It is also evident that, on the basis of the definition of the nature and structure of intentional reference, metaphysical analyses and psychological analyses are intrinsically connected and that, in particular, Brentano's *descriptive psychology* is a sort of *inner psychophysics* which analyses and classifies psychic activities, their objects, and the laws of dependence among their components.

It seems, however, that Brentano's 'internal' shift raised more problems than those left unresolved by Fechner's psychophysics. The most substantial of these problems were, first, the relationship between the *content* and the (inner) *object* of the act of intentional presentation and, second, the relationship between the latter and the transcendent object of reference. Brentano had in fact distinguished two modalities of intentional reference: that of having something *for* (*als*) an object (*Object*) and that of having something *as* (*wie*) an object (*Object*), but the ambiguity of the initial formulation was still unresolved;¹² and the physical object of the transcendent world, moreover, continued to lie entirely outside intentional presentation. In other words, intentional presentation had only inner objects.

More generally, still unexplained in Brentano's account was the relationship between descriptive psychology and genetic psychology, or once again the psychophysical problem. Of this Brentano himself was well aware:

My school draws a distinction between psychognosis and genetic psychology (a distant analogy being that between geognosis and geology). The former contains all the psychic elements which when combined produce the totality of psychic manifestations, in the same way as the letters of the alphabet produce the totality of words. Psychognosis could serve as the basis for a *characteristica universalis* such as that envisaged by Leibniz and before him Descartes. The latter teaches us the laws which determine how psychic manifestations appear and vanish. Given that—because psychic functions indubitably depend on the workings of the nervous system—these are in large part physiological conditions, we see that in this case psychological research must combine with physiological research.¹³

That this problem had a fundamental bearing on the theory of intentional reference is demonstrated by the fact that Brentano's best pupils (with the exception of Husserl) created and directed laboratories of experimental psychology, and that the origins of Gestalt psychology can be credited to three of them: Stumpf, Ehrenfels and Meinong.

The varieties of reference

The problems raised by the distinction between (i) object as *Gegenstand*, (ii) object as *Objectum*, and (iii) content (*Inhalt*) of the act continued to beset subsequent developments of Brentanist theory. The various solutions proposed also laid the basis for the development of phenomenology (and of a thoroughgoing theory of intentionality in Husserl—a theory which,

strictly speaking, was absent in Brentano)¹⁴ and of Meinong's ontology (theory of objects).

Both theories, moreover, developed amid a debate which involved all of Brentano's pupils, including Höfler, who in his *Logic* co-authored with Meinong and published in 1890 wrote concerning the intentional relation that:

What we called 'content of the presentation and the judgment' lies as much completely within the subject as the act of presentation and of judgment itself. The words 'thing' and 'object' are used in two senses: one on the one hand for that *independently existing entity*... at which our presentation and judgment aim, as it were; on the other hand, for the mental, more or less approximate 'picture' of that real entity which *exists 'in' us*. This quasi-picture (more accurate: sign) is identical with the content... In distinction to the thing or object, which is assumed to be independent of thinking, one also calls the content of a presentation (similarly: of a feeling and willing) the '*immanent or intentional object*' of these mental phenomena.¹⁵

Thus, for Höfler the inner intentional object and content coincided.

At the beginning of his study on the 'content and object of presentations,'¹⁶ Twardowski cited the above passage by Höfler, while pointing out that the ambiguities surrounding the concept of 'presentation' also concerned the concept of 'presented,' which could be used to denote both content and object. Twardowski's analysis of the 'presented' and his development of a theory of modification were significant contributions to advancement of the theory of intentional reference.¹⁷

As regards the *content* of presentations, after pointing out that the difference between the object and content of presentation is *not absolute*, Twardowski defines it as 'the content of the act which aims at the object conceived through its content,' although he observes that the content of a presentation may quite easily be the object of another presentation.¹⁸

As to the *object* of presentation, this Twardowski defines broadly as 'all that is conceivable,'¹⁹ while also specifying that the reality of an object has nothing to do with its existence.²⁰

In summarizing his arguments on content and object, and with particular reference to Brentano's original theory, Twardowski writes:

Everything that is presented through a presentation, that is affirmed or denied through a judgment, that is desired or detested through an emotion, we call an object. Objects are either real or not real; they are either possible or impossible objects; they exist or do not exist. What is common to them all is that they are or that they can be the *object* (*not* the intentional one!) of mental acts, that their linguistic designation is the name... and that consid-

ered as *genus*, they form a *summus genus* which finds its usual linguistic expression in the word 'something.' Everything which is in the widest sense 'something' is called 'object,' first of all in regard to a subject, but then regardless of this relationship.²¹

For Twardowski, an act always has an object (of different status), while the content assumes the status of a *mental image*; a position which brought him close to psychologism and was severely criticised by Husserl.²²

A crucial point in Twardowski's interpretation of the theory of intentional reference is his insistence, following Brentano, that although act and content constitute an indivisible *single psychic phenomenon*, they do not have the same ontological status: only the *act* is *real* in the sense of being *concretely existent*. The content has a weaker sort of existence akin to that which Aristotle attributed to the perceptive form of objects.²³

This is not the place for detailed analysis of Twardowski's theory, which incidentally also comprised a sophisticated account of the whole of presentation and its parts.²⁴ Nevertheless, it should be noted that Meinong's theory of objects sprang from the distinctions drawn by Twardowski, and from the analysis, made by Twardowski, of the innumerable possible varieties of object and content and their diverse forms of existence and dependence.

The 'jungle' of objects that populate Meinong's ontology, and which so bewildered Russell, therefore arose from these premises.²⁵ Meinong preserved Brentano's key concepts (immediacy, evidence, and the metaphysical foundation of intentional reference), but he immediately distinguished object from content,²⁶ while accepting Twardowski's thesis that reference is also made to transcendent (i.e. non-intentional, non-immanent) objects, although such reference comes about via immanent contents. Unlike Twardowski, however, he assigned the same status of existence to the act and content of presentation.²⁷

More specifically, Meinong developed his theory of intentional reference on the basis of the following five items:

1. the concept of *object*,
2. the concept of *existence*,
3. an extension of the category of psychic phenomena (*assumptions*),
4. the nature of *presenting*,
5. a distinction among *moments* internal to presenting.

To what extent did Meinong's theses influence his contemporaries, and what is the overall significance of his theory?²⁸

'Sind wir Psychologen?'²⁹

The *Manifesto* of the Vienna Circle in 1929 lists Brentano, Meinong and Höfler as thinkers with interests akin to its own, which is a testimonial to the importance of their theories for philosophy at the time, and for Austrian philosophy especially. Indeed, albeit only briefly, Brentano's lectures in Vienna attracted numerous disciples and provoked lively discussion. Shortly thereafter, however, no trace remained of the Brentanists in logical neopositivism, and whilst the Vienna Circle's theories enjoyed a decades-long success, those of Brentano, Höfler and Meinong lapsed into obscurity. There were several reasons for this outcome, but they all concerned the Circle's shift to a form of physicalist and logicist analysis which prevented philosophical reflection from including cognitive aspects derived from logic, the philosophy of language, and obviously the metaphysics and theory of representation; aspects that had instead characterized Brentanism.³⁰

As for Meinong, during his twenty-five years of teaching at Graz (1882-1907) he managed to create a school which attracted pupils from every part of Europe.³¹ Moreover, his psychology laboratory, which he set up in 1894 and directed thereafter, achieved experimental results that earned the respect of the international community of psychologists, and in particular, despite subsequent polemics, of the members of the Berlin branch of Gestalt founded by Stumpf.³² The polemics involving Meinong's psychologist pupils, Benussi in particular, continued to centre on the allegedly excessive variety of entities in Meinong's ontology, and on the intrinsic difficulty of the terminology used to classify them. Instead, as regards their experimental research, Meinong's pupils achieved results—especially in the analysis of perceptual illusions and temporal apprehension—which are still highly regarded today.³³

For both Meinong and Brentano, psychology and philosophy were areas of research intrinsically bound up with each other. In 1904 Meinong wrote:

We have always been of the opinion that experimentation in psychology is never an end in itself, but that it should serve the purpose of psychological theory, and this latter is a fundamental constituent, an integral part, but only one part of the totality of the sciences closely related and united under the name of philosophy. Consequently, the Graz laboratory of psychology, as one of the two 'philosophical institutes' in this university, is linked to the second one, that is, the philosophical seminar; and even if externally it is thus linked only by a sort of union between the persons who have directed it, internally is even more closely connected through the institution of the two organizations and the scientific work conducted to their interior.³⁴

And in 1910, he declared in the preface to the second edition of *On Assumptions* (1910):

the theory of assumptions can pride itself on the success of having been chosen as one of the mainstays for a new theoretical edifice, namely that of *genetic* psychology—the latest, most arduous, and most promising of the special psychological disciplines.³⁵

Viewed in these terms, Meinong's work on assumptions is the maximum point of development of Brentano's descriptive psychology, but it is also the one most distant from it.

Like Brentano, Meinong enjoyed a good reputation in England, partly as a result of the interest aroused by Lotze's work. His theories were introduced by J. S. McKenzie, who together with J. Jones and J. H. Muirhead, a pupil of Caird, was a representative member of English idealism. Meinong was also admired by Stout, whose *Analytic Psychology*³⁶ was highly appreciative of his work; indeed, it was the debate on critical idealism which introduced Moore and Russell to the Brentanists' thought, and the interest in Meinong's theories was probably a secondary aspect in a more general polemic waged against idealism.³⁷

The relationship between Meinong and Russell, which prompted the latter to elaborate his theory of descriptions, still has to be clarified in its details, as witness Russell's 1913 manuscript on the Theory of Knowledge, and the fact that Russell continued to belabour Meinong even many years later.³⁸ Russell's interpretation and criticism of Meinong's theories long predominated in the twentieth century, and the first objections against them were only raised in the 1960s, mainly by Chisholm.³⁹

Besides England, Meinong's theories also began to circulate in Italy at the beginning of the century, largely as a result of Brentano's residence in Florence for almost twenty years (1875-1916) and the relationships that developed between the Graz laboratory and the laboratory of experimental psychology created, again in Florence, by De Sarlo in 1903.⁴⁰ Moreover, De Sarlo's journal *Cultura filosofica* made an important contribution to the spread of the Graz school's ideas in Italy by constantly publishing reviews of its members' publications.

It was in particular the ethical theories of Meinong and his pupils that provoked debate in Italy, and especially so through the work of F. Orestano, who in 1907 introduced the expressions 'proper values' and 'translated values' with direct reference to the terminology (*Eigenwerte*, *Wirkungswerte*) employed by Ehrenfels.⁴¹ In experimental research, it was E. Bonaventura and R. Calabresi who were most responsible for the dissemination of Benussi's work in Graz, especially on temporal apprehen-

sion.⁴² Meinongian theories lapsed into oblivion in Italy, for political reasons, as a consequence of which the De Sarlo group was dissolved; their only discernable experimental influence was the Italian gestaltism that arose when Benussi moved from Graz to Padua in 1919.⁴³

As regards Germany, Werle has pointed out that there is no study available on the influence of Meinong in that country, although Cassirer refers to his theories in both *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen* and *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff*, particularly when developing his 'cognitive' theory of relations,⁴⁴ and surely there are points of contact between Meinong' and Hartmann's ontologies, as testified by their correspondence.⁴⁵

More in general, the oblivion that surrounded Meinong's thought for decades was due both to the complexity of his thought and to the linguistic style and vocabulary with which it was expressed. A significant factor in the loss of interest in his thought was the negative judgment on his work passed by Oxonian analytic philosophy, and by Ryle in particular, who in 1972 declared that Meinong's theory of objects was definitively 'dead.'⁴⁶

But what precisely were Meinong's theories?

The fascination of the minute

Meinong constructed a sophisticated ontology intended to be a theory of *every* kind of entity. It therefore comprised entities which are *de facto* impossible like the 'gold mountain,' impossible like the 'round square,' negative like 'non-smokers,' or incomplete like the 'ideal triangle.' These are entities which, *because they are thinkable*, according to Meinong are endowed with existence, although this is a particular type of existence or pseudo-existence.⁴⁷

Consequently, analysis of the distinctions that single out and characterize the various types of entity is of prime importance in Meinong's ontology. So much so that, as Findlay remarked, when reading the works of Meinong and more generally of the Meinongians, one is overcome by a sort of 'fascination of the minute.'⁴⁸

Meinong used the term *Gegenstandstheorie* for the first time in an article published in 1903, 'Bemerkungen über den Farbenkörper und das Mischungsgesetz,' in which he distinguishes the psychology of real, experienced colour from the theory (of the object) of chromatic space, of possible or thinkable colours.⁴⁹

In his contribution to a collection of essays published in 1904, *Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie*, which reviews the work conducted during the decade 1896-1904 by the Meinong school's two 'seminars' of philosophy and psychology, Meinong sets out the essential

components of his ontology, which can be summed up in the following two features: (i) maintenance of the Brentanian foundation; (ii) innovation of the theory of intentional reference. Meinong's theory, in fact, preserves the feature of *directedness* but also asserts the *twofold* nature of knowledge, or the fact that although the object is identified by being known, it is not reducible to what is known. Meinong writes:

For, to be precise, the psychological event we call cognition does not constitute the cognitive situation in and of itself: knowledge is, so to speak, a double fact (*Doppelthatsache*) in which what is known confronts the act of knowing as something relatively independent. The act of knowing is not merely directed toward what is known, in the way in which a false judgment may be directed toward its Object. In knowing, on the contrary, it is as though what is known were seized or grasped by the psychological act, or however else one might attempt to describe, in an unavoidable pictorial way, something which is indescribable.⁵⁰

Meinong also draws a rather peculiar distinction between *metaphysics* (theory of the existent in the *real* sense, both physical and psychic) and *ontology* (theory of *possible* objects).⁵¹ He writes as follows in an addendum to the second edition of *On Assumptions*:

In justification of the theory of objects:

1. There is a need for a science of the totality of objects. One might regard metaphysics as such a science. But in that case, metaphysics would at least have to treat existing and nonexistings things on the same footing; i.e. it would presumably have to leave existence as such out of consideration, which would certainly run counter to the intentions of metaphysics. One might therefore divide metaphysics into 2 parts, existential metaphysics (*Daseinmetaphysik*) and metaphysics independent of existence (*daseinsfrei Metaphysik*). But in that case, all that it amounts to in regard to the theory of objects is a redesignation; adjustment would have been made to the notion of the theory of objects.

2. There is a need for a science that puts objects in the characteristic perspective of an a priori approach, a science whose main emphasis is on this approach, as opposed to the empirical attainment of knowledge, and which accommodates itself to the needs of such a distinctive approach—not only occasionally and according to incidental needs, as the empirical sciences have always done.⁵²

In this manner, moreover, Meinong extended the concept of the object of the intentional reference of presentation to every possible kind of object: besides those which really exist, to objects of the past and of the future, to ideal objects (like 'diversity' and 'similarity'), to the objects of presentations

and to those of judgements (what he calls 'objectives'), and so on.⁵³ From this point of view, the realm of metaphysics is obviously smaller than that of ontology, and while metaphysics lies very close to the natural sciences, ontology, as the domain of the *a priori*, is associated with formal sciences like mathematics. And the latter, as Höfler remarks in a paper of 1905, since Leibniz and Hume has been a science situated 'beyond the real and the non-real.'⁵⁴

Moreover, when distinguishing (unlike Brentano) between immanent object and transcendent object, Meinong increased the weight of realism, so to speak, in the theory of intentional reference. He did so by extending the concept of ontological existence to include objects with a weaker type of existence than that possessed by real ones; objects, that is to say, which are only *intended* (*meint*) in intentional reference and which therefore merely *subsist* (*bestehen*).⁵⁵ This extension of the concept of existence also entailed specification of the already-mentioned twofold nature of the cognitive function. This distinctive element in Meinong's theory states that knowing is directed to the apprehension of both *Being* (*Sein*) and *So-Being* (*So-sein*) (for example, geometric properties). As Meinong puts it:

geometric figures do not exist, as we know; nevertheless, their properties, and their so-being as well, must be established.⁵⁶

This second type of reference is applied not only to ideal objects but also to impossible ones.⁵⁷

The principle of the *independence of so-being* from being, or the fact that we can attribute any constitutive property whatsoever to thought objects, independently of whether or not they exist, is, as said, one of the most distinctive features of Meinong's ontology, and it was the one that was most misunderstood by Russell and Moore.⁵⁸

However, it is this principle of unrestricted freedom of assumption that constitutes one of the most original aspects of Meinong's development of the theory of intentional reference. It is, in fact, an extension of the Brentanian theory of the *directedness* of the act (i.e., that every presentation is directed towards an intentional object), but it seeks to account for the passage between the mere presentation of the object to its recognition. Thus, *assumptions* (*Annahmen*)—'a domain of facts between presentation and judgment'—are added to the Brentanian classification of psychic phenomena, and they are defined as mental states or presentations relative to questions, information given in speaking, or some sort of hypothetical inference, all of which, however, are devoid of the conviction that typifies judgments in the strict sense, and to which they cannot be equated.⁵⁹

Over the years Meinong gradually increased the compass of assumptions in his theory of intentional reference until they came to comprise *every type of intending*. He states in the second edition of *On Assumptions*:

Presentation really means nothing but this: that an experience provides intending, i.e. assuming with an object, in that intending seizes upon this experience as its basis.

If an experience has an object of its own (an immediate object) which is an objectum in the case of a representation and an objective in the case of a judgment, then the experience either presents this object or presents itself.⁶⁰

The most controversial aspect of Meinong's ontology—the one most widely misunderstood by both his contemporaries and most of the analytic philosophers who revived some of its themes—concerns its cognitive basis, and in particular the relationship between its psychological underpinning (theory of production) and the theory of objects.⁶¹ In this regard, in 1904, and on several occasions, Meinong declared that the 'theory of objects' was the 'theory of knowledge,'⁶² and that the theory of objects was 'psychology.'⁶³ He also stated that the 'theory of the knowledge of objects' (or 'theory of objects') was an integral part of the theory of knowledge. His assumption of this theoretical position led to his inclusion, like Brentano, on the black list of psychologists,⁶⁴ though Meinong defended himself by claiming that a 'psychologist' looked at only one side of the question, given that the object maintains its relative independence from knowing.⁶⁵ Obviously, we only know objects through content, and content is closely correlated to the act. The Meinong group's position was summed up as follows by Höfler:

Of course, psychology is not *the* sole indispensable basis for *all* the philosophical sciences, but nevertheless it is *one* of them. And it remains such even though another discipline younger than psychology, the theory of objects, has become coordinated with it expressively and even externally.⁶⁶

Meinong also conceived his book of 1902 on assumptions as a work on psychology, and in effect it dealt in particular with the nature and classification of a great variety of psychic states, primarily presentations, thoughts, emotional presentations, and their objects.

With the passage of time, Meinong's writings came to place increasing emphasis on the independence of the object from its cognitive foundation, to the point that they envisaged the possibility of objects which may in principle belong to the object theory domain even if no-one actually ever thinks about them.⁶⁷

One of the most interesting components of Meinong's ontology is obviously its concept of *object*, from both the point of view of the classification of various types of object and from the point of view of its morphogenesis in intentional presentation.

The latter aspect, in particular, is discussed in Meinong's 1899 essay on 'Higher-order objects and their relationship with inner perception,' which gives further specification to the relationship between object and content.

Meinong defines 'higher-order objects' as those objects whose existence depends on others, like a 'melody' depends on the individual notes of which it is composed, or 'difference' depends on two more more colours compared against each other, or even negative objects like 'non-A.' Meinong develops another key concept in his ontology in this essay, that of *foundation* (*Fundieren*), which concerns the laws of dependence among the various types of cognitive phenomena and objects: for example, the laws that state that a judgement is necessarily founded on a presentation, one content is necessarily founded on another, or a higher-order object on a lower-order one.⁶⁸ The importance of this essay in the overall architecture of Meinong's ontology is difficult to gainsay, given its repercussions on experimental research in psychology⁶⁹ and on the development of the phenomenological theory of inner time.⁷⁰

Meinong's theory can be summed up as follows:

1. Any thought or corresponding expression can be assumed (principle of the unrestricted freedom of assumption, or the *unbeschränkten Annahmefreiheit* thesis).
2. Every assumption is directed toward an intended object (intentionality thesis).
3. Every intended object has a nature, character, *Sosein*, 'how-it-is,' 'so-being,' or 'being-so-and-so,' regardless of its ontological status (the independence of *Sosein* from *Sein* thesis).
4. Being or non-being is not part of the *Sosein* of any intended object, nor of the object considered in itself (the indifference thesis or doctrine of the *Aussersein* of the homeless pure object).
5. There are two modes of being or *Sein* for intended objects: spatiotemporal existence and abstract subsistence (*Existenz/Bestand* thesis).
6. Some intended objects do not have being or *Sein* at all, but neither exist nor subsist (There are objects of which it is true to say that there are no such objects—*es gibt Gegenstände, von denen gilt, dass es dergleichen Gegenstände nicht gibt*).⁷¹

Meinong and the Brentanists

Meinong's personal relationships with the other Brentanists were not always untroubled. His relationship with Brentano in particular was awkward, and this difficulty was also reflected in the relations among his pupils, a case in point being Höfler.⁷² Meinong felt ill at ease with Brentano mainly because of the differences between the two men's personalities—the extreme exuberance of Brentano and the extreme reserve of Meinong—coupled with Meinong's fear that the influence of his master would hamper the independent development of his thought.⁷³ However, when considering the matter as a whole, one should bear in mind that both Husserl and Meinong were subject to sustained intellectual assault by Kraus, and this conditioned their relationships with Brentano.⁷⁴

Meinong wrote on the subject as follows:

I am not lacking in gratitude toward Brentano, whose favorable attitude at the time encouraged and supported my first efforts in the field of philosophical enquiry. The risk that I might minimize the extent of this debt of kindness is reduced by the growing number of those to whom I subsequently tried to render some similar service and by my concern that the memory that these students of mine carry with them of the time of our working together is not an indifferent memory. Still, I should regard it almost as though my fate had been sealed by the circumstances under which I once entered into scientific work if, even as much as a quarter century later, enemies as friends of Brentano were constrained to hold something against me. For the former, it would be *that* I learned from Brentano. For the latter, it would be that I have not learned *everything* from Brentano and that instead, through honest effort in the course of my scientific activities, I have learned some things by myself—or properly speaking, from the facts. I should think that by now I had established a claim to count for something in my own right and to be rated according to the measure of whatever I have been able to contribute to my science through my own honest effort. That is not said to hurt Brentano's friends, and it is said even less, if possible, to please his foes; but as certain as it is that an impersonal goal was previously set for my life's work and will remain set for it in the future, just as certainly am I entitled to the fervent hope that I may encounter no difficulties or hindrances other than objective ones in the pursuit of this goal.⁷⁵

With regard to Brentano's other pupils, Meinong's most enduring relationship was with Husserl. Indeed, Meinong and Husserl corresponded for more than a decade (1891-1901), although their relations deteriorated thereafter as a result of a series of mutual misunderstandings (concerning, for example, the paternity of the concept of authentic and inauthentic presentation, and its meaning).⁷⁶ But perhaps the greatest difficulty in their

relationship was provoked by a further dispute over conceptual paternity, when both claimed that they had been first to formulate the concepts of 'assumption' and 'objective.'⁷⁷ On other occasions they argued over the use of the same terminology, for instance 'foundation.'⁷⁸

The correspondence between Meinong and Husserl centred on a number of themes of mutual interest: the theory of relations (which related to comparison among the contents of presentations, and in particular to analysis of founded contents)⁷⁹ and the problem of temporally extensive wholes of presentation.⁸⁰ The latter topic concerned the mereology of the wholes of presentation that Brentano had first analysed in the 1880s.⁸¹ It was of great importance and required examination of the following issues:

1. whether the parts exist before analysis of the whole;
2. whether, following analysis, a further type of content is realized;⁸²
3. whether the founded content is constituted by the sum of the relations between the parts and the whole.

These themes were essential for Twardowski's interpretation of the theory of intentional reference, and they stand at the origins of phenomenology in that they were analysed by Husserl in his Third Logical Investigation.⁸³

As regards Meinong, however, it should be noted that his analysis of the theory of relations yielded a further result with a bearing on the theory of intentional reference: the necessary temporal extensiveness (duration) of the wholes of presentation, which was a question that had occupied Brentano throughout his lifetime and was subjected to thorough experimental analysis in the Graz laboratory.⁸⁴

Viewed in their entirety, moreover, the theories of Meinong and Husserl seem to be more similar to each other than they are to Brentano's. In many respects, the work of Meinong and Husserl consisted in the formal development (the domain of the *a priori*) of the theory of intentional reference, something that was never of particular interest to Brentano, whose main concern was to delineate a substantially constructivist *philosophy of evidence*.

Höfler and Ehrenfels, formerly Brentano's pupils in Vienna, followed Meinong to Graz in 1882 when he was appointed to a senior lectureship in that city, and they became his close friends (Höfler in particular) and collaborators (Meinong considered Ehrenfels to have best continued his work on the theory of value).⁸⁵ Hints of conflict between Brentano's most loyal disciples (Marty, Kraus, Kastil and Mayer-Hillebrand) and Meinong's group in Graz emerge from Ehrenfels' reminiscences on Brentano,⁸⁶ but the most overt clash between the two groups was the already-mentioned dispute between Marty and Höfler.⁸⁷

Russell's Critique of Meinong

A similar fate has befallen other developments of Meinong's ideas, and those of his students and later logicians and philosophers associated with Meinong's school. To appreciate the impact of Meinong's thought on the subsequent course of philosophy, we should begin with the most sustained attack on Meinong's object theory in the highly influential, virtually devastatingly effective criticisms of Bertrand Russell. This will serve as a prelude to an account of the recent and contemporary state of Meinong scholarship and Meinongianism as a continuing philosophical movement in logic, philosophical semantics, psychology, epistemology, metaphysics, and value theory, ethics and aesthetics, as a legacy of the contributions made by Meinong and his extended family in the Graz school.

Russell was at first an enthusiastic admirer and in his own way a revisionary follower of Meinong's object theory as late as 1904.⁸⁸ Rather suddenly, however, then, in the space of less than a year, he came to be one of its greatest opponents. It is no exaggeration to say that Russell in his 1905 essay 'On Denoting' and reviews of several especially of Meinong's edited collections of papers on object theory almost single-handedly discredited Meinong's philosophy in the mainstream of analytic philosophical opinion.⁸⁹ There are few philosophers who have suffered so unfairly in the judgment of philosophers and historians, as a result of drastic distortions of Meinong's ideas. Meinong has been the victim of unfounded myths about his philosophical positions. These attitudes have been perpetuated all too often by commentators who have not bothered to study Meinong's original writings, irresponsibly casting Meinong's work in a highly disadvantageous light. It is no less accurate to say that Russell's criticisms of Meinong are historically at the root of the widespread disfavor in which Meinong's philosophy has fallen in analytic circles since the heyday of Meinong's school.

Russell in *The Principles of Mathematics*, a dress-rehearsal for *Principia Mathematica*, appreciates the importance of establishing a semantic category for all objects. There, so to speak, objects are supposed to be available for reference and predication. An object must stand ready for thinkers to think and say things about it. This is as true for early Russell as for Meinong. Objects, even if they do not exist, must be capable of being referred to and to have properties truly or falsely predicated of them. It is only from such a semantic domain that we can single out particular objects as existing or failing to exist. Russell in this way hopes to be able to answer Plato's question in the *Parmenides* and *Sophist*, concerning the intelligibility of denying an object's existence when the object truly fails to exist.⁹⁰

Prior to adopting his later more self-conscious semantic extensionalism, Russell was deeply committed to what might be called the being-predication thesis. The being-predication thesis states that an object must have at least some kind of being in order to be referred to in logic or language, and in order to stand as the subject of true predications of properties. How is it possible for an object to truly be blue or truly square or truly to have any properties whatsoever, if the object does not truly exist? Russell, who throughout this period regards such questions as rhetorical, believes, even prior to his rejection of Meinong's object theory, that no object can have properties unless it has being. This is a strange concession, although it is easy enough to see the conflicting theoretical desiderata Russell hopes to satisfy by distinguishing between existence and being. He proposes thereby to allow that even nonexistent objects must have at least what he speaks of as 'logical being' in order to truly fail to exist.⁹¹

It is not necessarily objectionable for Russell to have adopted the being-predication thesis. The trouble is that he is so thoroughly convinced of the thesis that he seems unable to imagine that other semantic theorists, notably Meinong, in whose work in object theory Russell at this time was greatly interested, should not also accept that an object must have at least logical being in order even to be truly said not to exist.⁹² But it is precisely a principled denial of the being-predication thesis that is at the heart of Meinong's *Gegenstandstheorie*. Russell confuses his own belief in the being-predication thesis with Meinong's doctrine of the independence and indifference of *Sosein* from *Sein*, which he disastrously reads into Meinong's account of the *Außersein* of the pure object. Where Meinong explicitly denies that an object must have being in any sense at all in order to be referred to and to have properties truly predicated of it, Russell from the beginning is unwavering in his stance that all objects, which, in defiance of the use-mention distinction, and of the distinction between language and its referents, confusingly designates as 'terms,' must have logical if not physical being. Russell is so ineluctably entrenched in the being-predication thesis, that he mistakenly attributes it to Meinong. Meinong, however, deliberately takes the opposite position, maintaining that objects must belong to a semantic domain regardless of their ontic status, as a precondition for predications and denials of properties, including existing or not existing, possessing or failing to possess being.

One problem that obfuscates the discussion between Russell and Meinong during this period is terminological. Meinong means something rather different by 'being' (*Sein*) than Russell. Meinong, indeed, adopts the medieval scholastic distinction between two modes of being, spatiotemporal existence and subsistence. But he holds that some objects such as Berkeley's and Hume's golden mountain or the round square lack being alto-

gether, and must in any case be considered logically independently of their ontic status. Russell, by contrast, at least during the time between writing *Principles of Mathematics* and 'On Denoting,' understands being as including physical, abstract, and logical modes, and extends being in one of these modes or other to everything that can sensibly be referred to as the bearer of qualities or that can stand as a relatum in a relation. Russell wants any and every object to have being of some sort, apparently because he finds it inconceivable for an object to stand as a referent or as the bearer of properties unless it has being in some sense. To such an extent is Russell locked into this way of thinking about reference and predication, that, ironically, after he has seen through its errors, he finds it necessary to reject Meinong's object theory on the mistaken assumption that Meinong also accepts the being-predication thesis.

Although Russell speaks about logical being, whereas Meinong affects to detach ontic factors altogether from questions of reference and predication, it might be wondered whether Russell after all understands Meinong well enough, and whether the differences that seem to divide them at least until 1905 are not pervasively terminological. This seems doubtful in the extreme. We cannot simply map Russell's references to logical being onto Meinong's references to *Außersein*. Russell's proposition that all objects must have at least logical being in order to be referred to and to have properties truly predicated of them is contradicted by Meinong's assertions that objects can be referred to and have properties truly predicated of them even if they are altogether beingless. Indeed, the category of *Außersein* was specially upheld by Meinong for homeless (*heimatlose*) intendable objects of reference and predication that are beyond being and nonbeing (*jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein*).⁹³ The category of *Außersein* is supposed by Meinong to be logically unique in this regard, in that it admits of no opposite. Objects can either have or fail to have being. But they cannot either have or fail to have or belong to the category of *Außersein*, for this is just the semantic repository of objects considered as such, without which they could not be *Gegenstände*.

Could Russell say something similar about his concept of logical being? Might he not maintain that no object could conceivably fail to have at least logical being, so that the difference between Russell and Meinong during this phase of Russell's initial attraction to Meinong's ideas might be reduced to a mere verbal disagreement? Opinions may differ on this issue, but it appears that Meinong's object theory is very different in conception from the conventional Fregean semantic framework to which Russell consistently avers. Meinong's lack of rigorous training in modern logic and semantic philosophy, due partly to inclination and the unavailability of instruction during his relatively late turn toward philosophy at the Univer-

sität Wien, may have serendipitously stood him in good stead. It allowed him greater freedom in exploring the consequences of a transcendentalized version of Brentano's immanent intentionality thesis in a conspicuously non-Fregean framework. The theory of intendable objects that emerged after Meinong's collaboration with Alois Höfler on Höfler's (1890) *Logik*, and reinforced by Twardowski's later but more widely received (1894) *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellung*, bears little resemblance to the extensionalist semantic philosophy that Frege and Russell were willing to recognize exclusively as scientific.⁹⁴

To suppose that an object must in some sense have being, even if only logical being, in order to be referred to, denoted, and to truly have properties is intuitively appealing, and answers well in countless applications where spatiotemporally existent or abstract subsistent objects are concerned. It is not Meinong's view, however, and Meinong's importance in logic and philosophical semantics can be seen precisely in his dialectical opposition to the extensionalist presuppositions of any broadly Fregean reference and predication theory. Russell's concept of logical being is, therefore, by no means a mere terminological variant on Meinong's concept of *Außersein*. By this language Russell evidently intends a type or category or mode of being, whereas Meinong's semantic subdomain, as even its nomenclature indicates, is supposed to be altogether beyond questions of being and nonbeing. Meinong's semantics is thus diametrically opposed to Russell's ingrained Fregeanism. Unlike Meinong, Russell seeks to bring being back into the picture explicitly as a precondition *sine qua non* for the reference and true predication of properties to objects—including objects that neither exist as spatiotemporal entities nor subsist as abstract platonic entities. The difference is underscored by the fact that Russell at any period of his work in the field of philosophical semantics would not understand logical being as placing an object altogether outside the distinction between being and nonbeing in the manner of Meinong's concept of *Außersein*. Russell, in fact, prior to 1905, confusedly introduces the concept of logical being expressly to bestow an honorary extensionalist title of being even on objects that are said not to exist or not to have spatiotemporal or abstract being beyond the ubiquitous possession of logical being that is supposed to be shared by all existent and nonexistent objects alike.

Meinong perhaps saw more clearly than Russell that there was no future in the idea of extending any type of being to all actual or potential objects of thought, if, as it seems, it is thinkable for an object to be altogether beingless. Meinong, during an early stage of his research, had considered but turned away from a similar approach involving the attribution of what he revealingly referred to as '*Quasisein*' or quasi-being. Meinong rejects *Quasisein* because as an ontic qualification, he believes it intuitively must

admit of its contrary, quasi-nonbeing. This, he holds, it must be thinkable for some objects to have, as presumably he would also say of Russell's concept of logical being with respect to the thinkability of logical nonbeing. Here we run smack dab into an ontic-semantic dead-end. For, if we can think of an object as lacking logical being, then on Russell's theory and according to broadly Fregean extensionalist philosophical semantics generally, we cannot intelligibly refer to and predicate the property of logical nonbeing of an object that is freely assumed to be beingless in the sense of failing to possess even Russell's category of logical being or Meinong's early exploration of *Quasisein*.⁹⁵

The only way to escape the excluded middle of a quasi-being / quasi-nonbeing or logical being / logical nonbeing duality, Meinong concluded, is by positing a semantic realm for objects as such, or for the pure object considered as such only in itself, beyond attributions of being and non-being. The pure object beyond being and nonbeing can be intended as the predication subject for any property or its complement, and can stand in any relation for which it is logically eligible regardless of the actual condition of the world. This is the aspect of Meinong's semantics that has excited the greatest interest among contemporary logicians and philosophers, because it holds out the possibility of freeing logic from the contingent facts of existence to a greater extent than classical existence presupposition-laden quantificational logics and (existence presupposition-) free logics. As such, Meinongian logic provides a more natural formal model of ordinary and scientific thought and language than classical or free logics.

For Russell, the very idea that there could be altogether beingless objects or objects considered independently of their ontic status to which we might refer and truly predicate properties is unthinkable. Yet the position, vital as it is and resolutely insisted upon by Frege, Russell, and others in the tradition, is never critically examined or defended by its adherents. It would nevertheless be very worthwhile to know what reasons if any might be advanced in support of the being-predication thesis, which Russell like other extensionalists never systematically considers. This difference in fundamental philosophical outlook as a result only partially explains why Russell pursues a very different path than Meinong's in trying to work out the semantics for logic and language in a Fregean vein, and why he so drastically misinterprets Meinong's doctrine of the *Außersein* of the pure object. It is also why Meinong's corollary principle of the independence of *Sosein* from *Sein* in any formulation remains invisible to Russell when he reads Meinong.

Finally, when the being-predication thesis begins to appear incoherent, as Russell eventually discovers, he is quick to blame Meinong, who by then had abandoned any version of quasi-being. Russell later concludes that

there is no hope for the concept of logical being, which he accordingly rejects in favor of a more militant, less specious extensionalism. If it is senseless to deny of any object that it has at least, or impossible to imagine that an object might lack even so much as logical being, then why not simply say the same of being? Russell acknowledges the possibility of referring to and truly predicating properties only of physically or abstractly existent entities, denying even the status of logical being that Meinong had never in the first place apportioned to beingless objects like the golden mountain and round square and the present king of France. Encouraging his more radically extensionalist semantics, Russell in his theory of definite descriptions develops ingenious if ultimately clumsy and implausible methods of paraphrasing-away apparent references to beingless objects, when their existence is denied, in negated existential statements of predicate logic, or what was then known as the calculus of functions. Ambiguities in the scope of negation are exploited in alternative formulations of definite descriptions, assumed by Russell as the true underlying forms of logically proper names in disguise, in order to avoid the formal logical necessity of designating nonexistent objects. The effectiveness of the method, however, and its philosophical presuppositions and implications have since been thrown into doubt independently of any Meinongian considerations, and many logicians today are skeptical of Russell's conclusions.

How, for example, can we translate the presumably true sentence, 'The winged horse is mythological'? Russell's analysis of definite descriptions appears to offer three possibilities. We can render the sentence literally on the model of Russell's of 'The present king of France is bald', with which it bears a striking grammatical isomorphism, simply as $(\exists x)(Wx \ \& \ Hx \ \& \ (\forall y)(Wx \ \& \ Hx \equiv x = y) \ \& \ Mx)$. This interpretation, however, makes the sentence false, given that the winged horse does not exist. Or, more compactly, but less completely, we might translate the sentence as $\sim(\exists x)(Wx \ \& \ Hx)$. This is true as far as it goes, but it leaves out entirely the property of being mythological, which is not merely a matter of nonexistence, but says something positive about the existence of a relevant myth and mythmakers. The third translation, $\sim(\exists x)(Wx \ \& \ Hx \ \& \ Mx)$, is even more unsatisfactory, if, as it appears, denying the existence of something to which the property of being mythological is predicated implies that the winged horse exists. It entails that everything in the logic's semantic domain is such that either it is not winged, not a horse, or not mythological, whereas the commonsense assumption is surely that it is true that the winged horse is mythological, and hence fails to exist.

If, as a last resort, we try to translate the sentence by introducing a new predicate 'S,' to represent the property of being a story, and a relational

predicate '*N*,' meaning that some discourse contains a name for what might generally be either an existent or nonexistent object, then we can proceed in two further ways to give a Russellian analysis of the sentence. We might first try to write, $\sim(\exists x)((Wx \ \& \ Hx) \ \& \ (\exists x)(Sy \ \& \ Nyx))$. Here '*N*' accomplishes something like a Quinean semantic ascent. The translation denies the existence of a winged horse, but asserts that there exists a story in which mention of a winged horse is made. This might be all we need to preserve the idea that there is something more to being mythological than failing to exist. The difficulty in this final effort is that if the sentence is supposed to be interpreted extensionally, which seems to be the point, then as a nonexistent object, the winged horse does not truly have a name, not even 'the winged horse.' That is, because the winged horse fails to exist, there is no entity in the extensionalist semantic domain that truly has the name, 'the winged horse.' If we try to make the semantic ascent in the proposal even more explicit by enclosing it in quotes, then we arrive at the following translation, which states $\sim(\exists x)((Wx \ \& \ Hx) \ \& \ (\exists x)(Sy \ \& \ Ny'$ 'the winged horse')). Again, we obtain thereby a true sentence, but one that seems not to completely analyze the meaning of the original. It is true that no winged horse exists, and that there exists a story, a myth, in which the term 'the winged horse' is mentioned. But now the negative existential with which the translation begins is vacuous in that part of the translation in which its scope overlaps with the second embedded existential quantifier. This means that the translation is logically equivalent to the conjunction, $\sim(\exists x)(Wx \ \& \ Hx) \ \& \ (\exists x)(Sy \ \& \ Ny'$ 'the winged horse'). A true sentence, no doubt, but one in which an essential connection between the mention of the terms or name 'the winged horse' in the second conjunct is logically independent of the nonexistence of any object with the properties of being winged and a horse. After all, we are lexically free even in an extensionalist semantics to use the form of words 'the winged horse' to designate any existent object we like, say, the Taj Mahal or Eiffel Tower, in a true story as much as in a myth. Without an explicit logical linkage between the object whose existence is denied in the first conjunct and the existence of certain names or terms in a story designated in the second conjunct, the formula cannot be regarded as a correct translation of the true sentence that 'The winged horse is mythological.'⁹⁶

Does this mean that the winged horse truly has the property of being mythological, in somewhat the same way that Seabiscuit truly has the property of being a racehorse? Meinong's object theory offers the same simplified identity conditions for beingless objects in the *Außersein* of the pure object as for actually existent or subsistent objects. The identity of an object, regardless of its ontic status, is what Meinong calls its *Sosein*, consisting of all the object's uniquely constitutive properties. This is what

makes a Meinongian semantics fundamentally intensional as opposed to extensional. Meinong is no existentialist, even in the popular philosophical conception; for he will never subscribe to Jean-Paul Sartre's frequently quoted and equally frequently misunderstood statement that for existentialism 'existence precedes essence.' For Meinong, logically and semantically at least, essence or the possession of a certain collection of properties precedes existence and ontic status generally. Ontic status, on the contrary, is predicated on the totality of properties in an object's *Sosein*, and in particular on whether such a totality of properties in an object's *Sosein* is consistent and complete. If so, the object has being; if not, the object is beingless. The identity of an object is similarly determined by its *Sosein* of associated essential and accidental properties considered collectively in effect as the object's individuating essence or *haecceity*.

Russell's theory of definite descriptions in 'On Denoting' nonetheless raised a new paradigm of analytic philosophy. The fact that he took the occasion to criticize Meinong's object theory had a profound negative impact on the reception of Meinong's ideas, especially in the Anglo-American philosophical community. What was taken to be the formal logical power and philosophical success of the theory of definite descriptions, breaking down every definite description into an existence assertion, uniqueness assertion, and predication, contributed enormously to the prestige of Russell's condemnation of Meinong's object theory. Russell very skillfully makes it appear, undoubtedly as a reflection of his own firm conviction, that there are only two choices for semantic philosophy, between Meinong's logically incoherent object theory, and the extensionalist semantics represented in part by his analysis of definite descriptions. Russell's criticism of Meinong's object theory has been thoroughly and competently discussed in the philosophical literature, where most scholars have concluded that Russell's objections pass by Meinong's object theory, because they are all based on the being-predication thesis which Meinong in his mature theory did not accept.

The rejection of Meinong's object theory and the triumph of the theory of definite descriptions seem to go together for many later analytic philosophers. Unfortunately, most thinkers trained in the analytic tradition know about Meinong only through Russell's disparaging references in 'On Denoting' and his reviews of Meinong's edited books in 1904, 1905 and 1907. From these sources, worthy as they otherwise are as an icon in the early history of analytic philosophy, it is not reliable to learn about what Meinong actually believed, for which the open-minded novice is better advised to turn directly to Meinong's own writings.

There is nevertheless a challenge in Russell's critique of Meinong that is not easily dismissed as a matter of misinterpretation. This is an issue

concerning the free assumption of counterfactual ontic properties. Russell, pressing Meinong's free assumption thesis, asks, if the golden mountain is golden and a mountain and the round square round and a square, whether the existent golden mountain and existent round square also exist. Meinong muddies the waters by maintaining that the existent golden mountain is existent even though it does not exist. Russell was unable to swallow the distinction on which this subtle solution rests, and so gave up on Meinong's object theory. He adopted, in light of what he took to be the failure of Meinong's semantics, an even more extreme version of extensionalism limited to actually existent physical and abstract objects, those minimally needed to make sense of true scientific propositions, with everything else commuted to luxury status in semantics, or, as in Frege, to poetry and associated feeling, deemed extrinsic to a correct scientific theory of meaning. Logical being, irrespective of its affinity or lack thereof with Meinong's concept of *Außersein*, is wholly surrendered at this juncture, and in its place Russell substitutes a narrow extensionalist commitment to the actual existence of the objects of philosophical semantics, excluding beingless objects one and all as beyond the pale of semantic comprehension, of reference and predication in thought or language.

The sociological reality is that in the community of analytic philosophers, rightly or wrongly, fairly or unfairly, Russell's 1905 refutation of Meinong's object theory came to be taken as the final definitive word by a dominant majority that subsequently came to regard Meinongian object theory as a hopelessly confused lost cause. The sad irony is that most of what are considered to be knock-down objections to Meinong's philosophy either depend on textually insupportable misinterpretations of Meinong's views, as in the case of Russell's mistaken attributions of some version of the being-predication thesis, which Meinong did not endorse and which Russell also later came to see as unsatisfactory, or they are easily answerable from within Meinong's system. The problem of the existent golden mountain and existent round square falls in this second category.

Meinong for complicated reasons did not avail himself of the best solution to Russell's puzzle. This, many later defenders of Meinong have held, would have been simply to apply the distinction between *konstitutorische und ausserkonstitutorische Bestimmungen* (nuclear and extranuclear properties, in J.N. Findlay's suggestive translation). According to Meinong's distinction, being golden and a mountain or round and square are freely assumable nuclear or constitutive properties that can belong to an object's *Sosein* regardless of its ontic status; while being existent, nonexistent, possible, impossible, determinate, indeterminate, and the like, are extranuclear nonconstitutive properties that are not freely assumable as part of the *Sosein* of any Meinongian object, on pain of engendering precisely the sort

of logical paradoxes with which Russell is concerned. Meinong did not make this reply to Russell, although he could have and many thinkers sympathetic to Meinong's cause have since maintained he should have. Instead, Meinong tries to take refuge in a labyrinth of further distinctions. He invokes, and seems to invent more or less on the spot, the concept of the watered-down (*depotenzierte*) nuclear counterpart of an extranuclear property like existence, which he claims lacks the modal moment (*das Modalmoment*) of full-strength factuality of the extranuclear property.

Meinong claims that the watered-down version of an extranuclear property, unlike the extranuclear property itself, can enter into an object's *Sosein* when freely entertained by the faculty of assumption or posited as an object of desire or value, as opposed to the extranuclear property, possessed of the modal moment of full-strength factuality, by virtue of which, in Russell's example, an object actually exists or subsists. Russell seems not to have looked very deeply into the merits of Meinong's complicated distinctions, but to have fled in horror from the theory as a whole when Meinong suggested in reply to his problem that the existent golden mountain or existent round square is existent (in the watered-down sense by which nuclear surrogates of extranuclear properties lacking the modal moment of full-strength factuality can be freely assumed as belonging to an object's *Sosein*), even though it does not exist (in the ontic status determining sense that alone confers real being on an entity). The distinction in any event appears desperate. The point is that Meinong is not bound or limited to it in answering Russell's otherwise reasonable objection, but can simply insist on the distinction between nuclear and extranuclear properties in order to blunt the criticism and avoid Russell's complaint.⁹⁷

Although Russell's critique has had an almost devastating impact on the reception of Meinong's philosophy, it is easy to conclude with Reinhardt Grossmann, Richard Routley, Janet Farrell Smith, and others, that whatever the sociological impact of Russell's objections on the course of analytic philosophy, Russell did not actually refute Meinong's object theory. Partly this is due to the fact that Russell did not clearly understand Meinong, and partly because Russell's arguments are in one way or another inconclusive. The climate in which the destiny of Meinong's philosophy was to be considered after Russell's theory of definite descriptions was and to a large extent remains unprecedentedly hostile to the concept of beingless objects in logic and philosophical semantics. It is an uphill battle for logicians and analytic philosophers who find it worthwhile to advance a refined formulation of Meinong's object theory even as an alternative for the sake of setting the now classical Russellian extensional logic and semantics in greater contrast, and who have a difficult time finding an unprejudiced hearing for a Meinongian semantic domain of existent, subsistent, and beingless

objects, or for the concept of the *Außersein* or extraontology of the pure object considered as such independently of its ontic status.

This has been a fact of life for those interested in Meinong's ideas during most of the intervening century. A kind of Meinongian renaissance has arisen in spite of popular disapprobation of Meinong's object theory. This upturn in Meinong's stock has gradually come about through the convergence of three factors: (1) A more careful scholarly reading of Meinong's original texts has shown that the criticisms standardly raised against his object theory cannot be responsibly sustained. (2) Dissatisfactions with the inadequacy of Russell's theory of definite descriptions, particularly as an adjunct to a Fregean theory of sense and reference have had the cumulative effect of prompting a reconsideration of other aspects of Russell's semantic philosophy, especially his denunciation of Meinongian object theory, and a reevaluation of the advantages and disadvantages of extensional versus intensional and intentional semantics in logic and the philosophy of language. (3) A broader discontent about the trend in philosophy of mind to suppose that all aspects of thought can be understood in a reductivist, purely extensionalist framework, has prompted a reconsideration of Russell's anti-Meinongian theory of definite descriptions, of which reductionism in the philosophy of mind historically is very much a piece. If there is more to the mind than neurons and rule-governed manipulation of neurophysiological 'messages'—if, in particular, thought cannot be understood except intentionally as Brentano argued, as about or directed toward intended objects—then, a new minority of philosophers have concluded, Meinong's investment of his Brentanian heritage in a combined ontology and extraontology of intendable objects, including the objects of fantasy and pure theoretical speculation, whether in the end they are existent, subsistent, or altogether beingless, is worth at least a second look.

The result of all these factors has contributed over the last several decades to a more open-minded attitude in the wholesale reappraisal of extensionalism versus intensionalism or intentionalism in philosophical semantics that may finally be positioned to avoid what Meinong spoke of polemically as 'the prejudice in favor of the actual' (*Das Vorurteil zugunsten des Wirklichen*).⁹⁸ To the extent that Russell's criticisms help to sharpen the distinctions needed to carry forward a revisionary version of Meinongian object theory, to that extent Russell remains if only inadvertently at the forefront of new interest in Meinong's philosophy.

Meinong's Renaissance

In the course of the twentieth century, the theory of intentional reference underwent considerable developments, the most celebrated of which was Husserlian phenomenology. Despite the existentialist and hermeneutic degenerations of an originally scientific conception of psychic phenomena, phenomenology is still today widely debated, and is of interest to certain sectors of analytic philosophy and research in artificial intelligence.⁹⁹

Marty's conceptual semantics, after significant development by the Linguistics Circle of Prague (especially by Jakobson),¹⁰⁰ has re-emerged in certain areas of contemporary cognitive semantics, although this re-emergence has gone entirely unnoticed.¹⁰¹

After Meinong's death and the death or retirement of his students, Meinong's philosophy no longer flourished—but neither was it totally extinguished. Russell's criticisms took their toll, World War II in a variety of ways inflicted havoc on the continuity of central European philosophy, and was especially disastrous for the Graz school, while extensionalist and reductivist trends in analytic philosophy, especially in logic, semantics, and philosophy of mind, appear mostly to have left Meinong's ideas behind. Meinong's school represents such an interesting and in many ways natural development of Brentanian scientific intentionalist philosophy, and was so directly connected with the phenomenological movement, that the efforts of Meinong and his students to produce and investigate the implications of object theory that it could not long remain unknown or unexplored at least by a scholarly subculture that has in fact arise in response. Many philosophers and historians of philosophy have helped keep the spark of Meinong's *Gegenstandstheorie* alive.

Among the most important post-WW II Meinong scholars must be mentioned J.N. Findlay, whose first (1933) and second expanded (1963) edition of *Meinong's Theory of Objects and Values* remains the most valuable, accurate, sympathetic, balanced critical study of Meinong's *Gegenstandstheorie* and *Werttheorie*. It is a resource, written partly under the directorship of Meinong's student and close collaborator Ernst Mally, to which every contemporary commentator on Meinong's work is indebted. Gilbert Ryle must also be mentioned in this timeframe as having read Meinong carefully. Legendarily, he offered to teach an Oxford University seminar on 'Bolzano, Brentano, Meinong and Husserl: Four Austrian Realists', about which it is often quipped that it concerned 'Ryle's three Austrian railway stations and one Chinese game of chance,' which no or too few students deigned to attend. Ryle nevertheless wrote several articles on Meinong's philosophy, including a positive review of the first edition of Findlay's book that inspired his critical assessment of Meinong in the

second edition above and beyond the philosophically detached exposition of the first.¹⁰²

Gustav Bergmann, Roderick M. Chisholm, Reinhardt Grossmann, Rudolf Haller, and other philosophers in the meantime understood that there was more of interest in Meinong's philosophy and the work of his school than Meinong's detractors were willing to acknowledge. Chisholm and Haller in particular did much to promote the importance of Meinong's thought and of Austrian philosophy generally through the twentieth and into the twenty-first century. There has in the meantime occurred a slow but steadily increasing engagement especially with Meinong's object theory and other aspects of his ontology and extraontology on the part of several succeeding generations of Graz school experts. The original experimental psychology undertaken in Graz in the laboratory Meinong founded continues to interest historians and psychologists and to shed light on the relation between object theory and the early days of scientific psychology in Meinong's interpretation of Brentano's intentionality thesis. A wave of formalization projects in Meinongian object theory has also moved through recent developments in nonclassical logic. These systems are situated at a variety of distances from Meinong's original principles, from efforts to formalize exactly what Meinong says in his mature formulation of the object theory, to others that are more loosely suggested by a generically Meinongian outlook in logic and semantics, to a handful of others still that are far removed from anything to be found in Meinong's writings, but are based on ideas that derive indirectly at least from some of Meinong's students. All of these topics are worth considering in detail, but we shall only be able to touch briefly on a selection.

The two most important booklength formal logical studies of Meinong's object theory to appear in the 1980s are Terence Parsons's (1980) *Nonexistent Objects* and Richard Routley's (1981) *Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond*. Both monographs, despite their authors' disclaimers as to textual or historical agreement with Meinong's philosophy, manage in different ways to adhere rather closely to what Meinong scholars take to be the central teachings of Meinong's original mature formulations of object theory. Parsons and Routley offer what logically trained readers of Meinong recognize as fairly faithful systematizations and formal logical symbolizations of at least some salient features of Meinong's ontology (and extraontology) and semantic philosophy.

Parsons's book is important for many reasons. Parsons takes Meinong at his word that beingless objects can be referred to and have properties truly predicated of them in an intensional and intentional philosophical semantics. He observes Meinong's distinction between nuclear and extranuclear properties, and he develops an extensive predicational theory for Meinon-

gian objects. More controversial aspects of Parsons's exposition include his decision to fit Meinongian *Objektive* (objectives, states of affairs and propositions) into a classical two-valued semantics. Parsons also fails to provide a formal criterion for the distinction between nuclear and extranuclear properties, and his classification of intensional properties of objects (such as being correctly or incorrectly believed by someone to possess a certain property) as extranuclear rather than nuclear. Parsons was not only first in the field with a complete exposition of a Meinongian logic, but his system remains indispensable reading and rewards continued reflection for students today interested in exploring the possibilities of Meinong's object theory in an ontically neutral but fully predicational nonstandard quantificational logic.

Routley (later Sylvan), in *Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond*, presents an encyclopedic consideration of Meinong's semantic philosophy and ontology and extraontology in the theory of objects. *Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond* was advertised as an 'interim edition' by the academic press at the Australian National University in Canberra, where Routley taught. It is a compendium, as even its multiple indexes indicate, of many rewritten essays and new material Routley brought together in the book, that nonetheless presents a unified overview of Routley's logical and philosophical reactions to Meinong's proposal for a theory of beingless objects. Routley like Parsons distinguishes his development of an explicitly Meinong-inspired theory of beingless objects from Meinong's original theory. Routley adopts a special nomenclature as well as a logical notation that nowhere appear in Meinong, speaking of his logic as a *noneist theory of items* rather than Meinongian theory of objects, to which it nevertheless bears an unmistakable similarity. Routley, again like Parsons, wants to avoid historical disputes over minutiae of Meinong scholarship for the sake of carrying forward some of Meinong's ideas within the much-changed framework of contemporary mathematical logic.

Routley takes Meinong literally in ascribing to him a theory of beingless objects. He brooks no compromise concept like Russell's notion of logical being to tame Meinongian objects and make them more presentable to a conventional extensionalist audience. He grasps fully how radically non-Fregean and non-Russellian a Meinongian logic must be established. Like Parsons, he endorses a version of Meinong's distinction between nuclear and extranuclear properties, and debunks, among the many myths that have circulated about Meinong's philosophy, the claim that any property is freely assumable as landing the Meinongian object theorist or Routleyan noneist in Russell's problem of the existent golden mountain and existent round square. Routley further understands that there can be no obstacle to treating the clusters of constitutive properties that belong to the identifying *Sosein*

or so-being of any object regardless of its ontic status in an otherwise standardly set theoretical fashion, and that it may be useful to speak of sets of nuclear properties that constitute an object's *Sosein*, and of sets of existent, subsistent, or beingless Meinongian objects in an ontically neutral noneist semantic domain of items in the formal model set theoretical semantics of Meinongian predicate and modal logics.

More formally interesting, especially in comparison with Parsons's bivalent version of object theory logic, is Routley's decision to apply Lukasiewicz's three-valued truth value semantics at the propositional foundations of his version of Meinongian logic and semantics. Meinong, infamously to some, included in the object theory incomplete and impossible objects. The golden mountain is incomplete but not impossible, because there are nuclear property and property-complement pairs for which the golden mountain is undetermined. The golden mountain, for example, as such, considering its identifying *Sosein*, is neither taller than nor not taller than Kilimanjaro; it is neither made entirely of 18- or 22-karat or any other exact purity of gold. These further qualifications of the golden mountain as an object that is thought of only as golden and a mountain are unspecified. The round square, by contrast, is incomplete in the same way as the golden mountain, but it is additionally an impossible object, since no object can possibly exist that is both round and square in the intended sense, as a characterization of its overall shape. It is easy to see that virtually all impossible objects are also incomplete. Still, we can imagine complete objects to whose *Sosein* one or more additional nuclear properties or their complements are added to define a new object that is both complete and impossible, up to and including what might be called the maximally impossible object, whose *Sosein* contains every nuclear property and its complement.¹⁰³

The inclusion of beingless objects in the Meinongian domain argues powerfully for Routley's adoption of a nonstandard three-valued or gap-valued propositional truth value semantics for a Meinongian logic. The proposition that the golden mountain is 22-karat gold is neither true nor false in a Meinongian object theory logic or Routley noneist theory of items, but either indeterminate or altogether lacking in truth value. The golden mountain considered only as such is incomplete, among countless other ways, because its *Sosein* lacks both the nuclear properties of consisting of 22-karat and consisting of non-22-karat gold. Routley, unlike Parsons, recognizes the need for a nonstandard truth value semantics and accordingly moves from classical bivalent to a trivalent propositional logic for his noneist theory of items. Routley's decision most naturally reflects the attitude Meinong seems to have held with respect to predications of nuclear properties to beingless objects. Pegasus is a flying horse, but

neither an Arabian nor a non-Arabian. We may know other things about Pegasus, but primarily all we can claim to know is that Pegasus is a flying horse. Similarly for all nuclear properties and their complements in objectives involving incomplete beingless Meinongian objects. Extranuclear properties are another matter, and Routley rightly extends a classical bivalent truth value semantics to extranuclear predications even of incomplete and impossible objects. Pegasus is either existent or nonexistent, possible or impossible, complete or incomplete, and so on, and not both, with no possibility in the category of extranuclear properties for any Meinongian objects to be metaphysically or semantically impossible or incomplete. Labels aside, Routley in his noneist theory of items is arguably the logician who has done the most to mathematicize and explore the formal structures within Meinong's later object theory.

Karel Lambert, like Routley a founder of free logic, in his invaluable (1983) study, *Meinong and the Principle of Independence: Its Place in Meinong's Theory of Objects and its Significance in Contemporary Philosophical Logic*, draws important distinctions between Meinong's principle of independence of *Sosein* from *Sein* and the *Außersein* principle of the indifference of the object as a semantic referent and predication subject to its ontic status. Lambert concentrates on the principle of independence, which he explains and for which he offers intuitive justification, before turning to free logic as a formalization of a predicate logic that achieves some of the same results in nonclassical predicate logic as the independence thesis is supposed to provide in Meinong's object theory. From a Meinongian point of view, free logic is certainly a step in the right direction. Lambert is right to emphasize the similarities between Meinong's desire in the principle of independence to liberate logic from its extensionalist presuppositions of actual existence and the ontic neutrality of free logic. But free logic in and of itself is insufficient to provide a Meinongian logic of beingless objects that can stand as logical referents and true nuclear predication subjects. Free logic casts off the burden of existence presuppositions for predicate-quantificational logic, but it does not go far enough for a Meinongian to be satisfied because it fails to make provision in its existence-presupposition-free semantic domain beingless objects like the golden mountain and round square that can be referred to as distinct objects of true predications.

It is not enough, from a Meinongian perspective, to claim as free logic does that existence presuppositions can be relaxed in predicate-quantificational logic and semantics; it is necessary also to introduce beingless objects into the semantic domain by means of the same identity conditions that prevail in extensionalist semantics for existent (or existent and subsistent) entities. The identity conditions for Meinongian objects

generally can be specified in terms of the nuclear or constitutive properties that enter into an object's *Sosein*; different *Sosein*, different object; same *Sosein*, same object, regardless of whether the object in question exists, subsists, or, like the golden mountain or round square, is altogether beingless. While free logic offers ontic neutrality, it does not provide a complete theory of predication for beingless objects as well as existent spatiotemporal or abstract entities. What is wanted is a theory that combines unrestricted ontic neutrality with a syntactically consistent formalism that offers a fully predicate-quantificational logic for the ostensible objects of thought and reference regardless of their ontic status. In this regard, Parsons's Meinongian logic and Routley's noneist theory of items come closer to Meinong's original object theory than any formalization of free logic.¹⁰⁴

Another attempt at the formalization of Meinong's object theory similar in spirit to Parsons's and Routley's appears in Dale Jacquette, an editor of the present volume, in his (1996) book, *Meinongian Logic: The Semantics of Existence and Nonexistence*. Jacquette's study seeks to synthesize key elements of Meinong's original mature object theory, in light of preceding logics and from the standpoint of Meinong's debt to Brentano. Jacquette offers a revisionary version of Meinong's object theory as a foundation for an intensional logic based on Brentano's intentionality thesis, and the distinction between psychological and purely physical phenomena by virtue of the intentionality of the psychological and nonintentionality of the purely physical. Jacquette like Routley adopts Lukasiewicz's three-valued logic to accommodate predications of nuclear properties to beingless Meinongian objects for which the objects are incomplete. He accepts and proposes formal criteria for Meinong's distinction between nuclear and extranuclear properties, and applies them in strict adherence to Meinong's independence of *Sosein* from *Sein* thesis in order to avoid Russell's problem of the existent golden mountain and existent round square. Jacquette classifies intensional or converse intentional properties as nuclear rather than extranuclear, and argues on textual grounds that Meinong also applied the distinction in this way.

A more recent adaptation of Meinongian logic is found in Jacek Pasniczek's (1998) volume, *The Logic of Intentional Objects: A Meinongian Version of Classical Logic*. Pasniczek develops a subject-predicate term logic in which names are interpreted as quantifiers of singular extension. The logic is made Meinongian when an 'ontology' of nonexistent objects is attached, and the theory is extended into free, modal, and two-sorted Meinongian logics, and applied to a philosophical study of reference and intentionality, and a theory of fictional 'entities.' Pasniczek avoids historical issues, and does not try to justify his term logic as specially suited for

Meinongian applications. An Aristotelian term logic, in which quantifiers are interpreted as names, might be regarded as more naturally Meinongian. In a Meinongian, as opposed, say, to a Fregean, semantic framework, anything thinkable enters the semantic domain as an intended object. The quantifications all, some, none, and so forth, might then be understood by a Meinongian as intended objects named by the corresponding quantifiers. Pasniczek's subject-predicate term logic by contrast does not make quantifiers into names, but construes names as singular quantifiers. Pasniczek champions subject-predicate term logic explicitly on extra-Meinongian grounds, arguing that it more straightforwardly represents the surface grammar of natural language predications and quantifications. 'Adam is not lazy' and 'Somebody is not lazy,' in Pasniczek's view, have a parallel grammatical structure, in which 'Adam' and 'Somebody' function alike as subject terms to which the same predicate is applied. Pasniczek's logic, when associated with the Meinongian 'ontology' Pasniczek eventually adduces, is a powerful and formally interesting language, the merits of which can be appreciated independently of the relation of the system to classical logic.¹⁰⁵

Finally, it is important to mention developments in logic and semantics, and in metaphysics and ontology, that are indirectly related to Meinong's object theory through ideas of some of his students, notably Mally. Here should be acknowledged Hector-Neri Castaneda's theory of particulars, guises, and consubstantiations, in which particulars are evidently something like Meinong's objects, and guises are conceptually akin to Meinong's nuclear properties in an object's *Sosein*.¹⁰⁶ Also essential to this part of influence of Meinong's school on contemporary logic and philosophy are the related sketches of a 'Meinongian' formal theory by Castaneda's student William J. Rapaport, in connection with Rapaport's investigation of a variation of Romane Clark's paradox for theories of nonexistent objects with unrestricted comprehension principles. Rapaport's frequently cited paper, 'Meinongian Theories and a Russellian Paradox', is essential reading for logicians and philosophers interested in the principles and limitations of Mallyan logic.¹⁰⁷ Rapaport distinguishes, as Mally but Meinong never did, between an object's exemplifying as opposed to its being constituted by properties of any kind, dispensing with Meinong's distinction between nuclear and extranuclear properties. An existent object exemplifies its properties, according to Rapaport's distinction, whereas a nonexistent object is at most only constituted by the properties attributed to it.

The idea goes back again to Castaneda's theory of guises. Although Castaneda acknowledges never reading Mally or Meinong, he understood that for a general theory of semantics, in a domain of entities identified intensionally by means of association with unique sets of properties,

objects that happen not to exist need not be said to possess properties in precisely the same sense as existent objects actually possess properties. Castaneda's theory of guises is best understood as outfitted with plural modes of predication, within which Castaneda during his lifetime had for different purposes recognized at least eight different modes of predication. Rapaport, by contrast, and other plural predication modes theorists in the extended Meinong school tradition, have not needed to distinguish more than two modes of predication for properties of any type, notwithstanding Meinong's distinction between *konstitutorische und ausserkonstitutorische Bestimmungen* (nuclear and extranuclear properties).

Rapaport limits his formalization of his Mally-inspired dual modes of predication theory to the form required for his explication of the Clark paradox, and he has not systematically investigated the ontology required by his analysis. It should be noted that Mally rejected Meinongian beingless objects as he began to develop his own more logically oriented variation of Meinong's object theory. Mally's logic embodies an extensional fragment of Meinong's object theory domain, for which Mally found it expedient to substitute dual modes of predication for existent versus subsistent objects in place of Meinong's adoption of Mally's prior distinction between nuclear and extranuclear properties. Mally thus moves significantly away from Meinong at the time he proposes the distinction between alternative modes of predication for objects depending on their ontic status. He follows the times by pursuing instead a more conventional Fregean-Russellian extensionalist semantics, equipped with two predication modes: one, exemplification, for properties of an existent object, versus constitution, by which properties are attributed to a nonexistent (but not explicitly beingless) object. Should Mally's later logic be considered Meinongian? We can do so, and probably not much harm is done. But Mally deserves more attention by contemporary logicians and philosophers for his own contributions that eventually placed him in most aspects of his research far away even from the central tenets of his teacher's philosophy. We should perhaps no more speak of later Mally as a Meinongian than we would speak of Wittgenstein as a Russellian or Heidegger as a Husserlian.

A similar but more instructive model for abstract entities is developed by Edward N. Zalta in a series of articles and two books, *Abstract Objects: An Introduction to Axiomatic Metaphysics* (1983), and *Intensional Logic and the Metaphysics of Intentionality* (1988). Zalta's nonexistent objects are abstract, rather than beingless in Meinong's sense; they are what Meinong would classify as subsistent, like ideal Platonic mathematical entities and universals, and Frege's *Gedanken* and *Sinne*. Like the later Mally, and Rapaport before him, Zalta adopts a dual modes of predication theory, for the *exemplification* of properties by existent objects and the *encoding* of

properties by nonexistent (abstract) objects. He distinguishes the two modes of predication nicely in his syntax by attaching object terms to the left or right of a predicate term. Unfortunately, Zalta does not offer formal criteria for distinguishing between exemplification and encoding predications, but relies on a case-by-case decision guided by considerations of theoretical explanatory necessity or convenience. Nonetheless, Zalta achieves an impressive rigorously formulated extension of Mally's distinction between dual modes of predication. Zalta is the inheritor of main features of Mally's ontology and semantic theory in the context of applied modern mathematical logic in much the same way that Parsons and Routley are the inheritors of Meinong's object theory.¹⁰⁸

Kit Fine has also played an important role, commenting among other topics on the choice between dual modes of predication and Meinong's distinction between nuclear and extranuclear properties in Meinongian or Mallyan logic and semantics. Fine develops a version of formal object theory in his (1985) book, *Reasoning With Arbitrary Objects*.¹⁰⁹

Philosophical Prospects for the Future of Meinong's School

The effect of all these factors in the broadly Meinongian ambit within the even broader Brentanian ambit is that there is presently more interest in Graz school and central European philosophy generally than ever before. There are more scholars, logicians and philosophers who have turned open-mindedly to Meinong's writings and those of his students and satellite thinkers of the period, and, of course, of his teacher Brentano. There are too many individuals currently active in this field of research to mention, and the reader is referred to the bibliographies at the end of each contribution for a more complete indication of recent authors and their works.

The present volume is intended as both a retrospective, taking stock of contemporary investigations in the philosophy of Meinong's school, and a kind of manifesto to encourage others to look more seriously into what Meinong and his students actually said about spatiotemporal and abstract being, and the properties of beingless objects, with their implications for a fresh approach to longstanding problems of logic, ontology, semantics, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophical and scientific psychology, epistemology, and value theory. These are among the central topics explored by the essays to follow. They are presented in the hope that they will serve to inform anyone interested in the philosophical milieu of Meinong's sphere of intellectual influence, in the wider school of Brentano, and in the specific philosophical issues to which Meinong and his entourage devoted their careers. If we can begin first to understand the history of

this period of central European philosophy correctly, accurately and without hostile prejudice, then we can continue to search for valuable ideas that may help us to achieve clarity and even concrete solutions to similar perennial philosophical problems in which we like Meinong in his time are still very much engaged.

To the extent that philosophy focuses on the intensionality of language as recalcitrant phenomena that fall outside the scope and limits of classical logic and conventional extensional semantics, and to the extent that it comes to be seen as worthwhile or even indispensable to apply a formal predicate-quantificational logic that is ontically neutral and predicationally complete with respect at least to the surface grammar of ordinary and scientific thought and language, to that extent the object theory principles and scientific psychological investigations made by Meinong and his school under the banner of Brentano's intentionality thesis will continue to interest new generations of historians and philosophers who want to understand this once vibrant branch of modern philosophy that holds a promise of becoming vibrant once again, given only a fair hearing and allowed to branch and blossom in new directions in contemporary philosophy.

Notes

- 1 See, for example, Searle (1983); Dennett (1991); Davidson (1967).
- 2 Dreyfus (1991); Smith (1996); Poli (2001).
- 3 See Albertazzi (1996a), (1996b), in particular pp. 11-14, and (1996c).
- 4 See Poli (1998a), Introduction.
- 5 Brentano (1874/1924), book 2, § 5.
- 6 See Albertazzi, Libardi and Poli (1996).
- 7 Brentano (1862), and (1867).
- 8 Brentano (1867), pp. 104-105.
- 9 Brentano (1988).
- 10 Brentano (1874/1924), pp. 154-155.
- 11 See Hedwig (1978).
- 12 Brentano (1952), pp. 119-20.
- 13 Brentano (1895), p. 34.
- 14 See Schuhmann (1993).
- 15 Höfler (1890), pp. 1-2.
- 16 See Twardowski (1894/1977).
- 17 Twardowski (1984/1977), in particular chap. 4.
- 18 Twardowski 1984/1977, chaps. 11, 60.
- 19 In this third sense the object does not consist of 'things' (*Dingen*), since these are only parts of objects.
- 20 Twardowski 1984/1977, p. 32 ff.
- 21 Twardowski 1894/1977, p. 37.
- 22 See Husserl (1902/1990-91).
- 23 See Findlay (1933), pp. 13-14.

- 24 See Poli (1996b) and (1996c).
- 25 The expression is from Kneale (1980). On the Meinong-Russell debate see Voltolini's contribute, this volume. See also Findlay (1933), repr. 1963, pp. 43-46; 100-110. Routley (1980), pp. 117-31. Grossmann (1974), pp. 114-16. Farrell Smith (1985). On the topic see Jacquette (1996a).
- 26 See Meinong (1899), § 2. See also Höfler (1906).
- 27 On the concept of 'content' in Meinong see Marek's contribution, this volume.
- 28 For treatment of individual topics see the essays in this volume.
- 29 Höfler (1906).
- 30 See Poli (1998a), Introduction; Albertazzi (2001a).
- 31 See Dölling, this volume. On the major and minor pupils of Meinong see Part 2, this volume. For personal reminiscences on Meinong by his pupils see Martinak (1925); Benndorf (1951); Weber (1972).
- 32 See Albertazzi's and Sinatra's contributions to this volume.
- 33 See Fraise (1961); Michon and Jackson (1991). See Albertazzi (2001b).
- 34 Meinong (1904b/1988), vii. See also Höfler (1890), § 5.
- 35 Meinong (1910/1983), Engl. ed., p. 7. Italics mine.
- 36 Stout (1896).
- 37 Dappiano (1997). On Meinong's influence in the Anglo-Saxon countries see Findlay (1952); van der Schaar (1996).
- 38 Russell (1913), especially the reprint in (1984) and ivi the Introduction by E. Ramsden Eames, pp. xv-xlvii.
- 39 Chisholm (1961).
- 40 See Albertazzi and Poli (1993). Albertazzi, Cimino and Gori-Savellini (1999). Poli (1999).
- 41 Orestano (1907); Ehrenfels (1897/8); see Poli (1996d).
- 42 See Albertazzi (1996d) and (1999b).
- 43 See Albertazzi's contribution, 'Benussi', this volume.
- 44 Cassirer (1910) and (1923). Cassirer cites Meinong (1877), (1891), and (1899). See Werle (1988), p. xvi, n. 7.
- 45 Meinong (1965), letter of Hartmann to Meinong on 28.09.1915.
- 46 Ryle (1972).
- 47 For an overview see Simons (1986); Jacquette (1996b); Poli's contribution, this volume.
- 48 Findlay (1933), p. 128.
- 49 Meinong (1903), p. 4.
- 50 Meinong 1904b/1983, p. 3. En. tr. p. 78.
- 51 Meinong 1904b/1988, pp. 39ff.
- 52 Meinong (1919/1983), En. ed., p. 275.
- 53 Meinong (1910/1983), chap. 3, and § 14 for the use of the term 'objective' in the school of Brentano. On the topic see the contributions by Jacquette, and Poli, this volume.
- 54 Höfler (1906), p. 324.
- 55 Meinong (1896), p. 250.
- 56 Meinong 1904b/1988, p. 7.
- 57 This principle is first formulated in Mally (1904). See Meinong 1904b/1988, especially §§ 3, 4, and 11.
- 58 See Russell (1913). See also Voltolini's contribution, this volume. On the spread of Meinong's thought in England see Albertazzi (1996b), 8; Dappiano (1997).
- 59 On the concept of 'assumption' see Poli's contribution, 'Assumptions', this volume. On the psychological aspects of the assumption, see Albertazzi (1999a).
- 60 Meinong (1910/1983), Eng. edn., p. 177.
- 61 See Sinatra's and Albertazzi's contributions, this volume.

- 62 Meinong (1904b/1988), § 6.
63 Meinong (1904b/1988), § 5.
64 Ueberweg-Heinze (1902), § 33.
65 Meinong (1904), § 6.
66 Höfler (1906), p. 323.
67 Meinong 1917/1972, especially chap. 2.
68 See the contributions by Poli, 'General thesis of the theory of objects,' and Albertazzi, 'Presentation and production', this volume.
69 Witasek (1908); Benussi (1913).
70 Husserl (1966).
71 As listed in Jacquette (1996a), p. 23.
72 See Kraus's introduction to Brentano (1924); Meinong 1921/1988, pp. 3-4.
73 Meinong (1910). On the relationship between Meinong's and Brentano's theories see Jacquette (1996c).
74 Kraus's introduction to Brentano (1924).
75 Meinong (1910), En. edn., pp. 3-4. See also Meinong (1921/1988), p. 4, and Dölling's contribution, this volume.
76 See Meinong (1965), I, p. 129 f.
77 Husserl (1900-1). Meinong (1910). Rollinger (1996a). See also Findlay (1972); Lindenfeld (1980), especially chap. 10.
78 Meinong (1910/1983), Engl. ed., chap.1, n. 21. See also Ameseder (1904), p. 72, n. 2.
79 See Husserl (1891); Meinong 1882, pp. 44ff, (1894) and (1899). On the topic see Rollinger (1996b), chap. 6.
80 See Husserl (1966); Meinong (1899).
81 Brentano 1982/1995.
82 See Meinong (1894) and (1899).
83 Husserl (1900-01).
84 Meinong (1894), Appendix. Brentano (1987).
85 Meinong (1910), Preface to the second edition, Engl. ed., 2. On the theory of value see Schuhmann's contribution, this volume.
86 Ehrenfels (1982).
87 Lindenfeld (1980), p. 66. See also Dölling, this volume.
88 In a letter to Meinong dated 1904, Russell says: 'I myself have been accustomed to use the name "Logic" for that which you call "Theory of Objects"...' The translation appears in Farrell Smith (1985), p. 347.
89 Russell (1904); (1905a); (1905b); (1907).
90 Russell (1903), p. 71: 'It should be observed that *A* and *B* need not exist, but must, like anything that can be mentioned, have Being. The distinction of Being and existence is important, and is well illustrated by the process of counting. What can be counted must be something, and must certainly *be*, though it need by no means be possessed of the further privilege of existence. Thus what we demand of the terms of our collection is merely that each should be an entity.'
91 See Jacquette (1996b), (2000a).
92 Russell (1971), p. 169: 'It is argued, e.g. by Meinong, that we can speak about "the golden mountain," "the round square" and so on; we can make true propositions of which these are the subjects; hence they must have some kind of logical being, since otherwise the propositions in which they occur would be meaningless.'
93 Meinong (1904b).
94 Höfler (1890); Twardowski (1894).
95 The principal source for Meinong's early concept of *Quasisein* is his 1904b essay, especially §4. See also Jacquette, '*Außersein* of the Pure Object' in the present volume.

- 96 Russell (1905a). Jacquette (1994); (1996b).
 97 See Jacquette (1986); (1996b).
 98 Meinong (1904b).
 99 See Chisholm (1967); Smith (1988), and (1994); Dreyfus (1991).
 100 See Jakobson (1933), p. 637.
 101 Albertazzi (2000).
 102 Ryle (1933a); (1933b); (1973). See Lyons (1980), p. 3.
 103 Jacquette (1995); (1996b).
 104 Jacquette (1988).
 105 Jacquette (2000b); Poli (1998b).
 106 Castaneda (1978); (1979).
 107 Rapaport (1978); also (1979); (1981); (1982); (1986).
 108 See Jacquette (1991).
 116 Also, Fine (1982); (1984).

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